El investigador ICSO y académico de la Escuela de Ciencia Política, Jorge P. Gordin, publicó el artículo ISI “The Price of Institutional Design: Biased Territorial Representation and Argentina’s Great Depression, 1998-2002”.
Jorge P. Gordin, Ph.D University of Pittsburgh, USA, Investigador Senior en GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. Su área de investigación es la política comparada, con especial énfasis en instituciones políticas. Se especializa en federalismo y descentralización en América Latina, con interés en Europa.
ABSTRACT: Comparative research on the structural determinants of fiscal crises has been largely shaped by approaches focusing on endurance and stability of institutional arrangements. This article takes aim with this conventional wisdom and contributes to this debate by exploring the trajectory that led Argentina to experience one of the most dramatic fiscal collapses of our era and the potential deleterious effect of legislative malapportionment, which is one of the most stable and resilient institutional characteristics of Argentine federalism. The analysis suggests that, strong, historically persistent, institutional arrangements have unintended distortionary fiscal consequences that extant research on institutional design often fails to acknowledge.